Worksharing Agreements: A Creative Answer to Statutory Mischief: When Is a Charge Timely Filed with the EEOC in a Deferral State under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act? by Bagin, Bruce
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 26 Number 2 Article 6 
1988 
Worksharing Agreements: A Creative Answer to Statutory 
Mischief: When Is a Charge Timely Filed with the EEOC in a 
Deferral State under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act? 
Bruce Bagin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bruce Bagin, Worksharing Agreements: A Creative Answer to Statutory Mischief: When Is a Charge Timely 
Filed with the EEOC in a Deferral State under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act?, 26 Duq. L. Rev. 379 (1988). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol26/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
WORKSHARING AGREEMENTS: A CREATIVE
ANSWER TO STATUTORY MISCHIEF: When is a
Charge Timely Filed with the EEOC in a Deferral
State Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act?
Bruce Bagin *
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Act"),' as amended,
prohibits the discrimination against any individual, by an employer,
with respect to that individuals working conditions because of his/
her race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 2 The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") was created by the Act
and is empowered to "prevent any person from engaging in any
unlawful employment practice" prohibited by sections 703 and 704
of the Act.3
* B.S., 1968, University of Wisconsin; J.D., 1983, Duquesne University;
Currently an Investigations Supervisor, EEOC, Pittsburgh, Pa. Views expressed are
those of the author and not necessarily those of the EEOC.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (1982).
2. Id. The original operative provisions contained in §§ 703 and 704 of the
Act were amended in 1972 to provide protection to applicants for employment, or
for applicants for membership in labor organizations, and to expand its regulatory
coverage to "joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs," Pub. L. No. 88-
352, 78 Stat. 253-8 (1964) as amended by Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
The term employer is used throughout this article to mean employer, employment
agency, labor organization, and joint labor-management committee controlling ap-
prenticeship or other training or retraining including on-the-job training. The term
working conditions is used to mean any term, condition, or privilege of employment
including the right to be free from any retaliation or reprisal that is caused by an
individual's opposition to any practice made unlawful by the Act, the filing of a
charge of employment discrimination, or testifying, participating or assisting in any
manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the Act.
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 705 and 706, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-4(a) and 2000e-5(a) (1982). While the original Act empowered the EEOC to
enforce the Act through "conference, conciliation and persuasion" it was not until
1972, when the Act was amended to provide the EEOC the authority to bring civil
actions, that 706(a) was amended to provide express enforcement authority to the
EEOC as follows: " The Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to
prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful employment practice as set forth
in §§ 703 or 704 of this title." Id. at § 2000e-5(a).
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The Act created an enforcement scheme in which the "limitations
period ' ' 4 for the filing of a charge of employment discrimination
with the EEOC varies from 180 days to 300 days5 depending upon
the state in which the unlawful employment practice occurred. In
those states in which there are state or local laws prohibiting em-
ployment discrimination and in which there is a state or local agency
("deferral agency or 706 Agency") which has the authority to grant
or seek relief from any such unlawful employment practice, an
aggrieved individual who "initially instituted proceedings" with such
an agency must either file his/her charge with the EEOC within 300
days of the alleged unlawful act or within thirty days after the
aggrieved individual receives notice from the deferral agency that it
has terminated its proceedings under the state or local law, whichever
is earlier. 6
4. The United States Supreme Court in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
455 U.S. 385 (1982), decided that "filing a timely charge of discrimination with the
EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement
that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable
tolling." Id. at 393. Because the Court likened the period in which a timely .charge
may be filed to that of a limitations period the article shall refer to this period as
the limitations period.
5. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e), which states:
(e) A charge under this section shall be filed within 180 days after the alleged
unlawful employment practice has occurred and notice of the charge (including
the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice)
shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within 10
days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with
respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with
a state or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice
or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice
thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved
within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or
within 30 days after receiving notice that the state or local agency has
terminated the proceedings under the state or local law, whichever is earlier,
and a copy of such charge shall be filed by the Commission with the state or
local agency. (emphasis added).
6. Id. at § 2000e-5(c). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
§ 706(c) states:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a state,
or political subdivision of a state, which has a state or local law prohibiting
the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a
state or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute
criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no
charge may be filed under subsection (a) of this section by the person aggrieved
before the expiration of 60 days after proceedings have been commenced
under the state or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier
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To further complicate matters, section 706(c) of the Act requires
that charges first received by the EEOC in a deferral state must be
deferred, to the deferral agency, for sixty days before they can be
"filed" with the EEOC. This is true as long as the sixty day deferral
period does not extend beyond the 300 day limitations period imposed
by section 706(e). A charge may also be "filed" with the EEOC
when proceedings are commenced with the deferral agency and the
agency terminates its proceedings on or before the 300th day from
the date of the alleged discrimination. 7 Proceedings with a deferral
agency are defined by the Act as being commenced at the time a
written and signed statement of the acts upon which the proceeding
is based is sent by registered mail to the appropriate state or local
authority.
8
This statutory procedural thicket has created mischief in deferral
states for the aggrieved, for state and federal enforcement agencies,
for employers and their respective counsel, and for the courts. 9 In
terminated, provided that such 60 day period shall be extended to 120 days
during the first year after the effective date of such state or local law. If any
requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a state
or local authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and
signed statement of the facts upon which the proceedings is based, the
proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this
subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the
appropriate state or local authority.
Note: Charges, when first received by the EEOC, were returned to the state or local
agency and any action by the EEOC was deferred for the appropriate statutory
period. In time, this process became known as the deferral process and the state or
local agency became known as deferral agencies.
7. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 817 (1980).
8. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, § 706(c), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). Love, infra notes 16-19, 63.
9. Mohasco, supra note 7 at 833-34 (Blackman, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted), which presented the following scenario:
Contemplate for a moment the plight of the local EEOC officer charged with
responsibility for explaining the Court's rule to a prospective Title VII com-
plainant in one of the Nation's 42 deferral states. The prospective complainant
informs the officer that he was fired from his job nine months ago, and now
has reason to believe that his discharge was motivated by racial discrimination.
He wants to know whether he still may file a timely charge with the EEOC.
Under the Court's rule, [the Court decided that the word "file" in § 706(c)
had the same meaning as the word "file" in 706(e)] the EEOC officer will
not be able to answer the concerned employee with anything more than an
equivocal "maybe." He must reply (paraphrasing the words of the Court,
ante, at 822) "It depends on whether you invoke your rights early enough to
allow the 60 day deferral period to expire within 300 days." In other words,
if the hypothetical complainant files his charge 270 days after his discharge,
and the EEOC refers the charge to the relevant state agency immediately, and
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an effort to control this situation and to ensure the establishment of
"effective and integrated resolution procedures" 0 the EEOC and the
deferral agencies have entered into worksharing agreements."
that agency terminates its proceedings within 30 days, the federal charge will
have been timely filed. But if the state agency does not terminate its proceedings
for a year (perhaps due to backlog or, ironically, because the complaint has
merit), then the EEOC cannot consider the charge to have been filed until
330 days have elapsed and the complainant will be unable to invoke his
federally protected rights.
The foregoing example demonstrates that the rule the Court adopts today
serves only to add more complexity to the already complex procedural pro-
visions of Title VII. To be sure, an employee will be able to guarantee timely
filing by bringing a complaint to the attention of the EEOC within 240 days
(a time limitation that nowhere appears in the text of the statute), but if that
employee files his charge between day 240 and day 300, he must await further
developments. This "wait and see" rule seems out of place in the context of
a federal statute designed to vindicate workers' rights to be free from invidious
discrimination in the workplace. Moreover, the Court's rule will no doubt
result in further complications that the courts or Congress will have to
disentangle. Id. (emphasis in original).
See E.E.O.C. v. Commercial Office Products Co., 803 F.2d 581, 585 (10th Cir.
1986), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 3208 (1987), for a summary of the problem as
follows:
The federal courts have continued to struggle with the time limitations for
filing a Title VII charge in deferral states. The frequency with which the
courts confront this issue implies that complainants in deferral states who
have failed to file a charge within 180 days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred are confused with respect to the applicable time
limitations. The confusion experienced by many complainants defeats two
important congressional goals: (1) the ease of filing civil rights charges by lay
complainants and (2) the timely resolution of civil rights charges. See Love v.
Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972). The subversion of these goals invites
legislative action. See Comment, The Procedural Filing Requirements of Title
VII in Deferral States: The Need for Legislative Action, 43 Omo ST. L.J. 675
(1982). Lacking that, however, we turn to an analysis of this case based on
the text of the statute, the legislative history, and the relevant judicial inter-
pretation. Id.
10. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(c) (1987) which is entitled "Agreements With Fair
Employment Practice Agencies" states:
Pursuant to § 705(g)(1) and § 706(b) [sic] of Title VII, the Commission shall
endeavor to enter into agreements with 706 Agencies and other fair employment
practice agencies to establish effective and integrated resolution procedures.
Such agreements may include, but need not be limited to, cooperative arrange-
ments to provide for processing certain charges by the Commission, rather
than by the 706 Agency during the period specified in § 706(c) and § 706(d)
of Title VII."
Id.
11. EEOC 15TH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1980). The Commission reported as
follows: Title VII requires EEOC to coordinate its efforts with state and local
governments. The state and local agency program integrates EEOC and fair em-
ployment practices (FEP) agency charge processing activities under worksharing
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This article will examine the historical development of worksharing
agreements, the provisions of an actual worksharing agreement, and
the present controversy concerning the effect, if any, of the work-
sharing agreement on the limitations period for filing a timely charge
with the EEOC in a deferral state.
I. HiSTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF WORKSHARING AGREEMENTS
The relationship between the EEOC and the 706 Agencies, or
deferral agencies as they are also known, was first described by the
EEOC in its procedural regulations 2 on July 1, 1965. The regulations
at that time focused on assisting the aggrieved individual in filing a
complaint with the deferral agency in order to comply with those
provisions of the Act which stated that no charge could be filed with
the Commission in a deferral state unless proceedings were first
initiated with the deferral agency. 3
On November 8, 1968, the Commission revised its procedural
regulations pertaining to the referral of complaints to state or local
authorities in order to "give full weight to the policy of section
706(b) [now 706(c)] of the Act which affords state and local fair
employment practices agencies that fall within the provisions of that
section an opportunity to resolve disputes involving alleged discrim-
ination concurrently regulated by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
agreements.
Worksharing agreements have served to eliminate duplication of effort and
delay in processing individual charges of discrimination, to protect the rights of
both charging parties and respondents, and to provide an equitable division of work.
EEOC also has been able to release certain of its personnel to concentrate in other
program areas as a result of sharing a national workload in charges of employment
discrimination. During FY 80, EEOC had worksharing agreements with 69 state and
local agencies.
12. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1966) which was entitled "Referrals to state and
local authorities" stated:
In any instance in which an aggrieved person seeks to file a charge and it
appears from the charge or from other information that the aggrieved person
has not begun proceedings before a state or local authority pursuant to §
706(b) [now 706(c)] of Title VII, the Commission may not accept the charge
for filing, but shall assist the aggrieved person in complying with § 706(b).
Id. In 1972 with the passage of the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-261, 86 Stat. 103, § 706(b) of the Act was renumbered with its text unchanged
to become § 706(c) of the amended Act. See supra note 6 for the text of this
provision.
13. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(c)(1981).
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of 1964 and state or local law. . .,,14 On March 25, 1969, the
14. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1969) which contained the revised text of the EEOC
procedural regulations regarding deferrals to state and local authorities stated the
new regulations as follows:
(a) In order to give full weight to the policy of § 706(b) [now 706(c)] of the
Act which affords state and local fair employment practice agencies that fall
within the provisions of that an opportunity to resolve disputes involving
alleged discrimination concurrently regulated by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and state or local law, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission adopts the following procedures with respect to allegations of
discrimination filed with the Commission where there is no evidence that such
allegations were earlier presented to the state or local agency. It is the intent
of the Commission to thereby encourage the maximum degree of effectiveness
in the state and local agencies. The Commission shall endeavor to maintain
close communication with the state and local agencies with respect to all
matters forwarded to such agencies and shall provide such assistance to the
state or local agency as is permitted by law and is practicable. It is the
experience of the Commission that because of the complexities of the present
procedures, persons who seek the aid of the Commission are often confused
and even risk loss of the protection of the Act. Accordingly, it is the intent
of the Commission to simplify filing procedures for parties in deferral states
and localities, and thereby avoid the accidental forfeiture of important federal
rights.
(b) The following procedures shall be followed with respect to cases arising
in the localities to which the Commission defers:
(1) Any document, whether or not verified, filed at any field office of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or at Washington, D.C., which
may constitute a charge cognizable under Title VII, shall be deferred to the
appropriate state or local agency pursuant to the procedures set forth below.
(i) All such documents shall be date and time stamped on receipt.
(ii) A copy of the original document shall be transmitted by registered
mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate state or local agency.
(iii) The aggrieved party shall be notified, in writing, that the document
which he sent to the Commission has been forwarded to the state or local
agency pursuant to the provisions of § 706 (b), and that unless the Commission
is notified to the contrary, on the termination of state or local proceedings,
or after 60 days have passed, whichever comes first, the Commission will
consider the charge to be filed with the Commission and commence processing
the case. Where the state or local agency terminates its proceedings within 60
days of the date of receipt of the document without notification to the
Commission of such action, the date on which the aggrieved party is notified
of the termination of the state or local action shall be deemed to be the date
that the document was filed as a charge with the Commission.
(iv) The 60-day period shall be deemed to have commenced on the receipt
of the document by the state or local agency as evidenced by the date indicated
on the return receipt. On notification of termination of state proceedings or
the expiration of 60 days, whichever comes first, the Commission will consider
the charge to be filed with the Commission and commence the case.
(v) In cases where the document is filed with the Commission more than
150 days following the alleged act of discrimination but less than 210 days
therefrom, the case shall be deferred pursuant to the procedures set forth
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Commission revised its procedural regulations to permit charges to
be filed with any designated agent. 5 The Commission's procedural
regulations regarding the deferral procedure were soon tested in Love
v. Pullman Co.'
6
In 1963 and 1965, Mr. Earl A. Love, a black individual who was
employed by the Pullman company in a position known as porter-
in-charge, filed a charge of racial discrimination in employment with
the deferral agency. The porter-in-charge positions were held pri-
marily by black employees.
17
In his charges with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission he
alleged that, because of his race, he was being paid less than similarly
situated white employees who were performing the substantially sim-
ilar duties of the conductor position. At the time, the conductor
position was held primarily by white employees. The Colorado Civil
Rights Commission terminated its proceedings in 1965 without re-
solving the complaint. 8
Love then sent a letter to the EEOC which was received on May
23, 1966, in which he made the same allegations. An EEOC employee
telephoned the Colorado Civil Rights Commission to report that the
EEOC had received the complaint. 19 Nine days after the EEOC had
above: Provided, however, That unless the Commission is earlier notified of
the termination of the state or local proceeding, the Commission will consider
the Charge to be filed with the Commission on the 209th day following the
alleged discrimination and will commence processing the case. Where the state
or local agency terminates its proceedings prior to the 209th day following
the alleged act of discrimination, without notification to the Commission of
such action, the date on which the aggrieved party is notified of the termination
of the state or local action shall be deemed to be the date that the document
was filed as a charge with the Commission.
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7 (1970), entitled "Where to file," stated: "Such charge
may be filed at the offices of the Commission in Washington, D.C., or at any of
its field offices or with any designated representative of the Commission."
16. 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
17. Id. at 523.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 524. The Court did not refer to the information that the EEOC
received from Love as a charge despite the fact that the EEOC had adopted a
regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11(b) (1971) that defined a charge as "a written
statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties and to describe generally the
action or practices complained of .... and instead referred to it as a complaint. 404
U.S. at 524 n. 2.
The Court referred to this pre-referral information variously as a "letter of
inquiry," a complaint, and a grievance. It would appear that its careful word choice
in this regard was not an accident, but instead was a deliberate attempt to reinforce
the position that such information is not a charge in a deferral state until proceedings
are first initiated with the deferral agency, and either the deferral agency waives its
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orally advised the Colorado Commission that it had received the
complaint, the Colorado Commission, in a June 1, 1966 letter to the
EEOC, "waived the opportunity to take further action" on Love's
complaint.20
The charge was investigated and the EEOC found reasonable cause
to believe that the allegations contained in Love's charge were true.
After the EEOC's efforts to achieve voluntary compliance failed,
Love initiated legal action which was dismissed by the district court
because Love had failed to meet the statutory conditions precedent
to suit. The judgment was affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
2'
In reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the United
States Supreme Court held that Love had complied with the intent
of the Act and that nothing in the Act suggested or implied that the
EEOC could not initiate proceedings with the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission on behalf of Love, nor was there any requirement that
the complaint to the state agency must be in writing. As the Court
noted, the language of section 706(b) [now 706(c)] "guards against
state proceedings that are difficult to commence, not against ones
that are easily begun."
'22
Love is important for several reasons. First, the Court equated the
term "waiver" and the phrase "declining to take action" with the
statutory language of sections 706(b) and (d) [now 706(c) and (e)] of
the Act, i.e., "termination of proceedings. ' 23 Second, the practical
procedure of the fledgling Commission for ensuring that important
federal rights of the aggrieved were not lost because of the statutory
mischief created by concurrent jurisdiction was upheld. 24 Finally, it
recognized that the Commission's regulation, which deemed a charge
filed when it is received, would only apply in non-deferral states
right to initially process the grievance, or 60 days passes, whichever comes first.
Love stands for the proposition that proceedings can be initiated with the
deferral agency, either orally or in writing, by the aggrieved or by the Commission
acting on behalf of the aggrieved, and there is no requirement that the aggrieved
return to file a charge with the EEOC after the state agency terminates its proceedings
or after 60 days. As the Court noted "[t]o require a second 'filing' by the aggrieved
party after termination of state proceedings would serve no purpose other than the
creation of an additional procedural technicality." Id. at 526.
20. 404 U.S. at 524.
21. Id. at 523.
22. Id. at 525-26 n.4.
23. Id. at 524-26.
24. Id. at 525.
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because of the "statutory prohibition of 706(b) [now 706(c)] against
filing charges that have not been referred to a state or local au-
thority.1 25 Shortly after the Court's decision in Love, 26 the Act was
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,27 and
sections 706(b) and (d) of the 1964 Act became sections 706(c) and
(e), respectively, of the amended act. No major changes were made
to the deferral state filing requirements of the 1964 Act except that
a charge could thereafter be filed with the EEOC within 300 days
from the date of the alleged discriminatory act occurring in a deferral
state rather than within the 210 days of the 1964 Act.
28
In order to implement the 1972 amendments to the Act, the EEOC
extensively revised its procedural regulations, including 1601.12.29
25. Id. at 526 n.5.
26. Love was decided on January 17, 1972.
27. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, approved March 24, 1972.
28. STAFF OF THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR AND
PUBLIC WELFARE, 92d Cong., 2d. Sess., Staff Report On The Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 Showing Changes
Made by Pub. L. No. 92-261 Approved March 24, 1972 (Comm. Print 1972) pp.
8-9.
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1973), in pertinent part, is as follows:
§ 1601.12 Deferrals to state and local authorities.
(a) In order to give full weight to the policy of § 706(c) of the Act, which
affords state and local fair employment practice agencies that fall within the
provisions of that section an opportunity to remedy alleged discrimination
concurrently regulated by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state
or local law, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission adopts the
following procedures with respect to allegations of discrimination filed with
the Commission where there is no evidence that such allegations were earlier
presented to an appropriate 706 Agency. It is the intent of the Commission
to thereby encourage the maximum degree of effectiveness in the state and
local agencies. The Commission shall endeavor to maintain close communi-
cation with the state and local agencies with respect to all matters forwarded
to such agencies and shall provide such assistance to the state or local agency
as is permitted by law and is practicable. It is the experience of the Commission
that because of the complexities of the present procedures, persons who seek
the aid of the Commission are often confused and even risk loss of the
protection of the Act. Accordingly, it is the intent of the Commission to
- simplify filing procedures for parties in deferral states and localities and
thereby avoid the accidental forfeiture of important federal rights.
(b) The following procedures shall be followed with respect to cases arising
in the jurisdiction of "706 Agencies" to which the Commission defers as
further defined in paragraph (c) of this section:
(1) Any document, whether or not verified, received by the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission as provided in § 1601.7, which may
constitute a charge cognizable under Title VII, shall be deferred to the
appropriate 706 Agency, as further defined in paragraph (c) of this section,
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However, it would be another five years before the EEOC would
completely rewrite its procedural regulations and submit them, for
the first time, for public comment.30 The new regulations were a
pursuant to the procedures set forth below.
(i) All such documents shall be date and time stamped
on receipt.
(ii) A copy of the original document shall be transmitted by registered
mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate state or local agency, or,
where the state or local agency has consented thereto, by certified mail, by
regular mail, or by hand delivery.
(iii) The aggrieved party and any person filing a charge on behalf of an
aggrieved party shall be notified, in writing, that the document .which he sent
to the Commission has been forwarded to the state or local agency pursuant
to the provisions of § 706(c), and that unless the Commission is notified to
the contrary, on the termination of state or local proceedings, or after 60
days have passed, whichever comes first, the Commission will consider the
charge to be filed with the Commission and commence processing the case.
Where the state or local agency terminates its proceedings within 60 days
without notification to the Commission of such action, the Commission will
consider the charge to be filed with it on the date the person making the
charge was notified of the termination.
(iv) The 60-day period shall be deemed to have commenced at the time
such document is mailed or delivered to the state or local authority. On
notification of termination of state proceedings or the expiration of 60 days,
whichever comes first, the Commission will consider the charge to be filed
with the Commission and will commence processing the case.
(v) In cases where the document is filed with the Commission more than
240 days following the alleged act of discrimination but less than 300 days
therefrom, the case shall be deferred pursuant to the procedures set forth
above: Provided, however, That unless the Commission is earlier notified of
the termination of the state or local proceeding, the Commission will consider
the charge to be filed with the Commission on the 299th day following the
alleged discrimination and will commence processing the case. Where the state
or local agency terminates its proceeding prior to the 299th day following the
alleged act of discrimination, without notification to the Commission of such
action, the Commission will consider the charge to be filed with it on the
date the person making the charge was notified of the termination.
30. 42 Fed. Reg. 47828 (1977). The Commission responded to the public
comments that were received and stated its reasons for adopting and publishing the
completely revised procedural regulations. The comments pertaining to § 1601.13,
which was entitled "Filing: deferrals to state and local agencies," were as follows:
Section 1601.13(a). Upon review, the Commission has determined that the
relationship between the distinct filing requirements of § 706(e) and § 706(c)
of Title VII would be clarified by making parallel the language of subsection
(a) and the subsection numbered (c)(2) in the proposed regulations. For this
reason the phrase "of satisfying the filing requirement" now contained in
renumbered (d)(2) also appears in subsection (a).
Section 1601.13(b). Upon review, the Commission has determined that it is
appropriate to make explicit that the Commission will assume jurisdiction over
a charge upon receipt where it is not subject to the jurisdiction of a 706
Agency. All succeeding subsections have been renumbered to accommodate
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significant departure from the prior regulations,31 in that they pro-
-the statement numbered (b).
Section 1601.13(c)(1). Upon review, the Commission has deleted the last two
sentences contained in the proposed regulations at subsection (b)(l) because
the reference to prior procedure is no longer appropriate.
Section 1601.13(c)(3). A few commentators questioned the authority of a 706
Agency to make an effective waiver of its right to exclusively process charges
during the deferral period established by § 706(c) of Title VII, where the 706
Agency has not terminated its processing of the charge. The legislative history
and case law indicate that the purpose of the deferral provision of § 706 (c)
was to guarantee state and local governments that wished to create or maintain
fair employment practice agencies the opportunity to process charges for a
period of time prior to any action by the Commission. That opportunity is
in no way diminished by the waiver procedure outlined in this subsection.
Upon review, the Commission has determined that its procedure would
be more clearly expressed by indicating that where a 706 Agency has waived
its right to exclusively process a charge the Commission will assume jurisdiction
over the charge "upon receipt."
Section 1601.13(d)(1)(ii). One commentator argued that the proceedings of 706
Agencies cannot be deemed to have commenced until the 706 Agency receives
a copy of the allegation of discrimination. The Commission's long-standing
procedure of counting the deferral period from the date on which such
allegations are mailed is authorized by the last sentence of § 706(c) of Title
VII which states that such proceedings "shall be deemed to have been
commenced ... at the time such statement is sent by registered mail .. "
Section 1601.13(d)(2). One commentator argued that the Commission should
require 706 Agencies to cease processing a charge when the Commission
assumes jurisdiction over the charge. The Commission recognizes the burden
to respondents and the inefficient use of governmental resources which could
be involved in any simultaneous investigations conducted by the Commission
and 706 Agencies. It contemplates the establishment and expansion of work-
sharing agreements with 706 Agencies which provide that only one agency will
have primary responsibility for the initial investigation. The Commission does
not have the authority to require a 706 Agency to terminate its proceedings.
Section 1601.13(f). Upon review, the Commission has determined that its
procedure would be more clearly expressed by adding that the Commission
may "make a preliminary investigation" for purposes of determining the need
for relief pursuant to § 706(0(2) of Title VII, notwithstanding the deferral
provisions of Title VII.
Section 1601.13(g). Upon review, the Commission has determined that its
procedure would be more clearly expressed by specifying the date on which a
charge by a member of the Commission is deemed filed. A new sentence for
this purpose has been added to the subsection numbered (f) in the proposed
regulations.
31. Id. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (1978), entitled "Filing; deferrals to state and
local agencies," contained the new regulations as follows:
(a) The timeliness of a charge shall be measured for purposes of satisfying
the filing requirements of § 706 (e) of Title VII by the date on which the
charge is received by the Commission.
(b) The Commission shall assume jurisdiction over charges not subject to the
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vided authority for the adoption of worksharing agreements, which
jurisdiction of a 706 Agency upon receipt.
(c) Deferral policy. (1) In order to give full weight to the policy of § 706(c)
of the Act, which affords state and local fair employment practice agencies
that come within the provisions of that section an opportunity to remedy
alleged discrimination concurrently regulated by Title VII and state or local
law, the Commission adopts the following procedures with respect to allega-
tions of discrimination filed with the Commission where there is no evidence
that such allegations were earlier presented to an appropriate 706 Agency. It
is the intent of the Commission to thereby encourage the maximum degree of
effectiveness in the state and local agencies. The Commission shall endeavor
to maintain close communication with the state and local agencies with respect
to all matters forwarded to such agencies and shall provide such assistance to
state and local agencies as is permitted by law and as is practicable.
(2) Section 706(c) of Title VII grants states and their political subdivisions
the exclusive right to process allegations of discrimination filed by a person
other than a Commissioner for a period of 60 days or 120 days during the
first year after the effective date of the qualifying state or local law. This
right exists where pursuant to subpart H of this part it has been demonstrated
to the Commission that a state or local law prohibits the employment practice
alleged to be unlawful and a state or local agency has been authorized to
enforce and does enforce that law through civil or criminal proceedings. After
the expiration of the exclusive processing period, the Commission may com-
mence processing the allegation of discrimination..
(3) A 706 Agency may waive its right to the period of exclusive processing
of charges provided under § 706 (c) of Title VII with respect to any charge
or category of charges. Where a 706 Agency has waived its right to the
exclusive processing period with respect to any category of charges, the
Commission will assume jurisdiction over charges within that category upon
receipt. Copies of such charges shall be forwarded to the appropriate 706
Agency.
(d) The following procedures shall be followed with respect to cases arising
in the jurisdiction of the "706 Agencies:"
(1) Where any document, whether or not verified, is received by the Com-
mission as provided in § 1601.8 which may constitute a charge cognizable
under Title VII, and where the 706 Agency has not waived its right to the
period of exclusive processing with respect to that document, that document
shall be deferred to the appropriate 706 Agency as provided in the procedures
set forth below:
(i) All such documents shall be dated and time stamped upon receipt.
(ii) A copy of the original document shall be transmitted by registered
mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate state or local agency, or,
where the state or local agency has consented thereto, by certified mail, by
regular mail, or by hand delivery. State or local proceedings are deemed to
have commenced on the date such document is mailed or hand delivered.
(iii) The person claiming to be aggrieved and any person filing a charge
on behalf of such person shall be notified, in writing, that the document
which he or she sent to the Commission has been forwarded to the state or
local agency pursuant to the provisions of § 706(c).
(2) For purposes of satisfying the filing requirement of § 706(c) of Title VII,
the Commission shall assume jurisdiction over a document described in par-
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held out the promise of being helpful in alleviating some of the
difficulties caused by the concurrent jurisdiction requirements of
sections 706(c) and (e) of the Act.1
2
On October 30, 1978, the Commission added a provision to its
guidelines 33 which addressed the problem of determining when a
agraph (d)(1) of this section as follows:
(i) Where the document on its face constitutes a charge within a category
of charges over which the 706 Agency has waived its right to the period of
exclusive processing referred to in paragraph (b)(3) of this section, the Com-
mission will assume jurisdiction over the charge upon receipt of the document;
(ii) Where the document is submitted to the Commission within 180 days
from the date of the alleged violation but beyond the period of limitation of
the appropriate 706 Agency, the Commission shall assume jurisdiction on
receipt of the document;
(iii) Where the proceedings of a 706 Agency have been commenced
pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this section, the commission shall assume
jurisdiction 60 (or, where appropriate, 120) days after the 706 Agency pro-
ceedings have been commenced, except where the Commission is earlier notified
of the termination of state proceedings, it shall immediately assume jurisdiction
upon receipt of such notice.
(iv) Where the proceedings of a 706 Agency have been commenced less
than 60 days (or, where appropriate, 120) days prior to the time the Com-
mission receives the document and those proceedings have not previously been
terminated, the Commission shall assume jurisdiction 60 (or, where appropri-
ate, 120) days after the 706 Agency proceedings have been commenced, except
where the Commission is earlier notified of the termination of state proceed-
ings, it shall immediately assume jurisdiction upon receipt of such notice.
(e) In addition to the provisions in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this section
and pursuant to § 705(g)(1) and § 709(b) of Title VII, the Commission shall
endeavor to enter into agreements with 706 Agencies and other fair employment
practice agencies to establish effective and integrated resolution procedures.
Such agreements may include, but need not be limited to, cooperative arrange-
ments to provide for processing of certain charges by the Commission, rather
than by the 706 Agency during the period specified in § 706(c) and § 706(d)
of Title VII.
(f) Notwithstanding the deferral provisions of this section, the Commission
may make a preliminary investigation and commence judicial action for
immediate, temporary or preliminary relief pursuant to § 706(f)(2) of Title
VII.
(g) A charge made by a member of the Commission shall be deemed filed
upon receipt by the Commission office responsible for investigating the charge.
The Commission will notify a 706 Agency when an allegation of discrimination
is made by a member of the Commission concerning an employment practice
occurring within the jurisdiction of the 706 Agency. The 706 Agency will be
entitled to process the charge exclusively for a period of not less than 60 days
if the 706 Agency makes a written request to the Commission within 10 days
of receiving notice that the allegation has been filed. The 60 day period shall
be extended to 120 days during the first year after the effective date of the
qualifying state or local law.
32. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(e) (1978).
33. 43 Fed. Reg. 50429 (1978) §§ 1601.13(d)(2)(iii) and 1601.13(d)(2)(iv)
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charge is filed with the Commission where the unlawful acts have
occurred after 180 days but less than 300 days in a deferral state
and within the limitations period of the 706 Agency. This provision
had inadvertently been omitted from its recently adopted regulations
but it had been upheld in two recent court cases. 34 As a result, it
was republished.
These deferral regulations, however, were soon to be undone by
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mohasco Corp. v.
Silver.35 The Court, reviewed the plain meaning of the statutory
language and a review of the legislative history of the 1964 Act and
the 1972 amendments to the Act and also the policy arguments in
favor of a more liberal construction of the Act36 and concluded that
the definition of "filing" in section 706(c) of the Act had the same
meaning as "filing" in section 706(e) of the Act.37
The Commission noted, in the announcement of yet another pro-
cedural rule change, "[tihe Court rejected the argument that a charge
can be considered timely filed for purposes of section 706 (e) as long
were redesignated as (d)(2)(iv) and (d)(2)(v) and a new paragraph, (d)(2)(iii),
was added so that the text of the changes were as follows:
29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (1979) "Filing; deferrals to state and local agencies."
[(d)(2)](iii) Where the document is submitted to the Commission more than
180 days from the date of the alleged violation but within 300 days and within
the period of limitation of the appropriate 706 Agency, the Commission shall
process the document in accordance with paragraph (d)(1) of this section and
shall assume jurisdiction 60 (or where appropriate, 120) days after the 706
Agency proceedings have been commenced, except that where the Commission
is earlier notified of the termination of the state proceedings, it shall imme-
diately assume jurisdiction upon receipt of such notice.
[(d)(2)J(iv) Where the proceedings of a 706 Agency have been commenced
pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this section, the Commission shall assume
jurisdiction 60 (or, where appropriate, 120) days after the 706 Agency pro-
ceedings have been commenced, except where the Commission is earlier notified
of the termination of state proceedings, it shall immediately assume jurisdiction
upon receipt of such notice.
[(d)(2)](v) Where the proceedings of a 706 Agency have been commenced less
than 60 days (or, where appropriate, 120) days prior to the time the Com-
mission receives the document and those proceedings have not previously been
terminated, the Commission shall assume jurisdiction 60 (or, where appropri-
ate, 120) days after the 706 Agency proceedings have been commenced, except
where the Commission is earlier notified of the termination of state proceed-
ings, it shall immediately assume jurisdiction upon receipt of such notice.
For the remainder of the regulation, see supra note 31.
34. Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1976) and Williamson
v. Chevron Research Co., 12 F.E.P.Cases 95 (D. Cal. 1976).
35. 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
36. Id. at 815.
37. Id. at 815-26.
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as it is received by the Commission within the 300 days even though
the deferral period of section 706(c) extends beyond the 300th day."
38
The new regulations were issued in final form some eight months
later, after an appropriate period for public comment,39 and had
38. 45 Fed. Reg. 81039 (1980).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (1982), as amended by 52 Fed. Reg. 10224 (1987)
and 52 Fed. Reg. 18353 (1987), "Filing; deferrals to state and local agencies."
Additional changes which were made in 1987 have been included so as to present
the most current version of the Commission's procedural regulations pertaining to
the relationship between the Commission and 706 Agencies, which includes the rules
for determining whether or not a charge is timely filed under the Act. The current
regulation states:
(a) Initial presentation of a charge to the Commission.
(1) Charges arising in jurisdictions having no 706 Agency are filed with the
Commission upon receipt. Such charges are timely filed if received by the
Commission within 180 days from the date of the alleged violation.
(2) A jurisdiction having a 706 Agency without subject matter jurisdiction
over a charge (e.g., an agency which does not cover sex discrimination or
does not cover non-profit organizations) is equivalent to a jurisdiction having
no 706 Agency. Charges over which a 706 Agency has no subject matter
jurisdiction are filed with the Commission upon receipt and are timely filed
if received by the Commission within 180 days from the date of the alleged
violation.
(3) Charges arising in jurisdictions having a 706 Agency with subject matter
jurisdiction over the charges are to be processed in accordance with the
Commission's deferral policy set forth below and the procedures in paragraph
(a)(4) of this section.
(i) In order to give full weight to the policy of § 706(c) of the Act, which
affords state and local fair employment practice agencies that come within
the provisions of that section an opportunity to remedy alleged discrimination
concurrently regulated by Title VII and state or local law, the Commission
adopts the following procedures with respect to allegations of discrimination
filed with the Commission. It is the intent of the Commission to thereby
encourage the maximum degree of effectiveness in the state and local agencies.
The Commission shall endeavor to maintain close communication with the
state and local agencies with respect to all matters forwarded to such agencies
and shall provide such assistance to state and local agencies as is permitted
by law and as is practicable.
(ii) Section 706(c) of Title VII grants states and their political subdivisions
the exclusive right to process allegations of discrimination filed by a person
other than a Commissioner for a period of 60 days (or 120 days during the
first year after the effective date of the qualifying state or local law). This
right exists where, as set forth in § 1601.70, a state or local law prohibits the
employment practice alleged to be unlawful and a state or local agency has
been authorized to grant or seek relief. After the expiration of the exclusive
processing period, the Commission may commence processing the allegation
of discrimination.
(iii) A 706 Agency may waive its right to the period of exclusive processing
of charges provided under § 706(c) of Title VII with respect to any charge or
category of charges. Copies of all such charges will be forwarded to the
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grown from the original one column inch in 1965, to the now more
appropriate 706 Agency.
(4) The following procedures shall be followed with respect to charges which
arise in jurisdictions having a 706 Agency with subject matter jurisdiction over
the charges:
(i) Where any document, whether or not verified, is received by the
Commission as provided in § 1601.8 which may constitute a charge cognizable
under Title VII, and where the 706 Agency has not waived its right to the
period of exclusive processing with respect to that document, that document
shall be deferred to the appropriate 706 Agency as provided in the procedures
set forth below:
(A) All such documents shall be dated and time stamped upon receipt.
(B) A copy of the original document, shall be transmitted by registered
mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate 706 Agency, or, where the
706 Agency has consented thereto, by certified mail, by regular mail, or by
hand delivery. State or local proceedings are deemed to have commenced on
the date such document is mailed or hand delivered.
(C) The person claiming to be aggrieved and any person filing a charge
on behalf of such person shall be notified, in writing, that the document
which he or she sent to the Commission has been forwarded to the 706 Agency
pursuant to the provisions of § 706(c).
(ii) Such charges are deemed to be filed with the Commission as follows:
(A) Where the document on its face constitutes a charge within a category
of charges over which the 706 Agency has waived its rights to the period of
exclusive processing referred to in paragraph (a)(3)(iii) of this section, the
charge is deemed to be filed with the Commission upon receipt of the
document. Such filing is timely if the charge is received within 300 days from
the date of the alleged violation.
(B) Where the document on its face constitutes a charge which is not
within a category of charges over which the 706 Agency has waived its right
to the period of exclusive processing referred to in paragraph (a)(3)(iii) of this
section, the Commission shall process the document in accordance with par-
agraph (a)(4)(i) of this section. The charge shall be deemed to be filed with
the Commission upon expiration of 60 (or where appropriate, 120) days after
deferral, or upon the termination of the 706 Agency proceedings, or upon
waiver of 706 Agency's right to exclusively process the charge, whichever is
earliest. Where the 706 Agency earlier terminates its proceedings or waives its
right to exclusive processing of a charge, the charge shall be deemed to be
filed with the Commission on the date the 706 Agency terminated its pro-
ceedings or the 706 Agency waived its right to exclusive processing of the
charge. Such filing is timely if effected within 300 days from the date of the
alleged violation.
(b) Initial presentation of a charge to a 706 Agency.
(1) When a charge is initially presented to a 706 Agency and the charging
party requests that the charge be presented to the Commission, the charge
will be deemed to be filed with the Commission upon expiration of 60 (or
where appropriate, 120) days after a written and signed statement of facts
upon which the charge is based was sent to the 706 Agency by registered mail
or was otherwise received by the 706 Agency, or upon the termination of 706
Agency proceedings, or upon waiver of the 706 Agency's right to exclusively
process the charge, whichever is earliest. Such filing is timely if effected within
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than thirty-seven column inches in 1981. In other words, the regu-
lations which were designed to explain when a charge is timely filed
under the "plain meaning" of the pertinent provisions of the Act,
had grown to more than a yard of newsprint in sixteen years. In
addition, the tension between sections 706(c) and (d) of the Act, and
the efforts of the Commission to provide a method of charge
processing that would provide for ease of understanding and ease of
300 days from the date of the alleged violation.
(2) When a charge is initially presented to a 706 Agency but the charging
party does not request that the charge be presented to the Commission, the
charging party may present the charge to the Commission as follows:
(i) If the 706 Agency has refused to accept a charge, a subsequent
submission of the charge to the Commission will be processed as if it were
an initial presentation in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
(ii) If the 706 Agency proceedings have terminated, the charge may be
timely filed with the Commission within 30 days of receipt of notice that the
706 Agency proceedings have been terminated or within 300 days from the
date of the alleged violation whichever, is earlier.
(iii) If the 706 Agency proceedings have not been terminated, the charge
may be presented to the Commission within 300 days from the date of the
alleged violation. Once presented, such a charge will be deemed to be filed
with the Commission upon expiration of 60 (or where appropriate, 120) days
after a written and signed statement of facts upon which the charge is based
was sent to the 706 Agency by certified mail or was otherwise received by the
706 Agency, or upon the termination of the 706 Agency proceedings, or upon
waiver of the 706 Agency's right to exclusively process the charge, whichever
is earliest. To be timely, however, such filing must be effected within 300
days from the date of the alleged violation.
(c) Agreements With Fair Employment Practices Agencies. Pursuant to §
705(g)(l)and § 706(b)[sic] of Title VII, the Commission shall endeavor to enter
into agreements with 706 Agencies and other fair employment practice agencies
to establish effective and integrated resolution procedures. Such agreements
may include, but need not be limited to, cooperative arrangements to provide
for processing of certain charges by the Commission, rather than by the 706
Agency during the period specified in § 706(c) and § 706(d) of Title VII.
(d) Preliminary relief. When a charge is filed with the Commission, the
Commission may make a preliminary investigation and commence judicial
action for immediate, temporary or preliminary relief pursuant to § 706(f)(2)
of Title VII.
(e) Commissioner charges. A charge made by a member of the Commission
shall be deemed filed upon receipt by the Commission office responsible for
investigating the charge. The Commission will notify a 706 Agency when an
allegation of discrimination is made by a member of the Commission con-
cerning an employment practice occurring within the jurisdiction of the 706
Agency. The 706 Agency will be entitled to process the charge exclusively for
a period of not less than 60 days if the 706 Agency makes a written request
to the Commission within 10 days of receiving notice that the allegation has
been filed. The 60-day period shall be extended to 120 days during the first
year after the effective date of the qualifying state or local law.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (1987).
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administration, while at the same time protecting the rights of the
aggrieved, continues, unabated, to the present time.4°
The unanticipated effect of section 706(c) of the Act, and one that
was not addressed by the Court in Mohasco,41 was to double the
workload of the 706 Agency because the Agency would not only
receive charges from those aggrieved individuals who first came to
the Agency but it would also receive charges from those aggrieved
who first went to the EEOC, and whose charges were then deferred
to the 706 Agency.
The Congress, in establishing the deferral requirement of section
706(c), relied upon the experience of the existing 706 Agencies in
deciding that most complaints would be resolved by the 706 Agency
in the sixty day period in which it had exclusive jurisdiction to handle
the charge of discrimination.4 2 Congress was just as mistaken, in this
regard, as it was in its belief that charges could be resolved without
any enforcement authority other than "conference, conciliation, and
persuasion."
43
40. The worksharing agreement which was adopted by the Commission to
eliminate the difficulties occasioned by the filing provisions of §§ 706 (c) and (e) is
now the center of controversy in several of the United States Courts of Appeal.
Two Circuits would allow the 706 Agency to waive its right to the initial 60 day
processing period for certain charges automatically by contract with the EEOC and
thereby permit the filing of charges with the EEOC in deferral jurisdictions up to
and including the 300th day. This treatment was given in Isaac v. Harvard University,
769 F.2d 817 (1st Cir. 1985) and Gilardi v. Schroeder, 833 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir.
1987). The courts in E.E.O.C. v. Commercial Office Products, 803 F.2d 581 (10th
Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 3208 (1987) and Dixon v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 787 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, (July 9, 1986)(No. 86-
181), interpreted the interaction between the EEOC and the state agency pursuant
to the Act and the provisions of the worksharing agreement differently.
41. Mohasco, supra note 7.
42. 110 Cong. Rec. 13087 (1964). (Remarks of Sen. Dirksen).
43. H.R. REP. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971), noted that:
An examination of the statistics with respect to the progress of equal employ-
ment opportunities clearly shows that the voluntary approach currently applied
has failed to eliminate employment discrimination. During the first five years
of its existence, the Commission has received more than 52,000 charges. Of
these, 35,445 were recommended for investigation. Of this number approxi-
mately 5607o involved complaints of discrimination because of race, 23070
disrimination on sex, and the remainder involved charges of discrimination
because of national origin or religion.
The number of charges is increasing. The incidence of discrimination does
not appear to be waning. In Fiscal Year 1969, the Commission received 12,148
charges; in Fiscal Year 1970, the Commission received 14,129 charges. In
testimony before this Committee, William H. Brown, III, Chairman of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, stated that during the first seven
and a half months of the current fiscal year, the Commission has received
14,644 charges, a greater number than the total charges received for all of
last year.
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In its 19th Annual Report the EEOC reported that "most of the
charges were processed within a 300 day period from the date of
receipt."" Moreover, in E.E.O.C. v. Commercial Office Products
Co., 4 the court, in referring to Senator Dirksen's view during the
1964 Congress that charges could be resolved within sixty days,
because "many cases are disposed of [by state agencies] in a matter
of days, and certainly not more than a few weeks" 46 stated, "[tihe
current backlog in many state agencies and the EEOC must cause
officials today to look wistfully at the period that Senator Dirksen
described." ,
47
An examination of the number of unresolved charges within the
EEOC should provide some indication of the effect the deferral
process has had on the year-end charge inventory of the 706 Agen-
cies. 48 It is commonplace that Congress intended the Act to be
effective and where, as here, the statutory provision creates a sixty
day procedural bottleneck that seriously hampers the effective en-
forcement of the Act, it would seem that the appropriate rule of
statutory construction for the court to follow should be that while
"a statute cannot go beyond its text, ' 49 "to effect its purpose a
statute may be implemented beyond its text." 50
Despite the somewhat uneasy situation and the confusion during
this period that was caused by the requirements of section 706(c) and
(e) of the Act, and by the United States Supreme Court's ruling in
Mohasco, the EEOC had managed to publish regulations which would
allow it to negotiate worksharing agreements with seventy-seven
deferral agencies by 1984.11
44. EEOC 19th ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1984).
45. 803 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct 3208 (1987).
46. 803 F.2d at 588 n.12.
47. Id.
48. EEOC TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 33 (1975). Information on EEOC's
year-end inventory of charges is difficult to obtain because the Commission's annual
report usually includes only the charges that it received and not the carryover of
charges from the preceding year. However, the Commission did report in 1975 that
its inventory at the end of 1966 was 2300 charges and, by its tenth year, its year-
end inventory had grown to 46 times that amount or 106,700. No subsequent annual
report has provided similar information.
49. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules
or Canons about how Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 n.3
(1950).
50. Id. at n.4.
51. EEOC 19th ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1984).
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II. THE WORKSHARING AGREEMENT
Worksharing agreements are authorized by law
5 2 and regulation5 3
"to establish effective and integrated resolution procedures. 51 4 They
are cooperative agreements with 706 Agencies which contain provi-
sions to ensure that an aggrieved person's state and federal rights to
be free from unlawful employment discrimination are protected by
means of a dual filing provision;55 to divide the work equitably
52. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(c) (1986) states that worksharing agreements are
authorized by § 705(g)(1) of the Act and by § 706(b) of the Act. However, it
appears that § 706(b) is a misprint since the earlier version included § 709(b),
nevertheless, the pertinent sections are included as follows:
Section 705(g)(1) provides as follows:
(g) The Commission shall have power-
(1) to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize regional, state, local and
other agencies, both public and private, and individuals;
Section 706 (b) provides in pertinent part that: "In determining whether rea-
sonable cause exists, the Commission shall accord substantial weight to final findings
and orders made by state or local authorities in proceedings commenced under state
or local law pursuant to the requirements of subsections (c) and (d)."
See also § 709(b) which states in pertinent part that: "In furtherance of such
cooperative efforts, the Commission may enter into written agreements with such
state or local agencies and such agreements may include provisions under which the
Commission shall refrain from processing a charge in any cases or class of cases
specified in such agreements or under which the commission shall relieve any person
or class of persons in such state or locality from requirements imposed under this
section. The Commission shall rescind any such agreement whenever it determines




55. See Appendix for a copy of a worksharing agreement between the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC") and the EEOC which was
used in Petrisin v. Montgomery Ward, C.A. No. 85-2476, (W.D. Pa. 1985) (case
resolved and withdrawn), in support of an affidavit in opposition to defendant's
motion to dismiss.
Section II (a) designates each agency as agent for the other for the purpose of
receiving charges.
Section II (b) requires each agency to inform others of their right to file with the
other agency and to assist any aggrieved individual in drafting a charge or in any
other manner in the filing of a charge with the other agency. In this regard the
worksharing agreement was amended effective November 1, 1982 to designate a
specific procedure which the EEOC was to follow in order to give notice to aggrieved
individuals of their rights under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. See Ap-
pendix p. 417.
Section II (c) provides that a charge taken by the PHRC on its complaint form
which meets the EEOC's jurisdictional and procedural requirements and which is
referred to the EEOC for dual filing will be considered as a charge filed with the
EEOC. The charge itself will state that the charge will be referred to the EEOC for
the purpose of dual filing.
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between the EEOC and the 706 Agency through a work sharing
arrangement;5 6 to make each the agent of the other for the purpose
of receiving charges;17 and to define those charges in which the 706
Agency agrees to waive its right, conferred upon it by the provisions
of section 706 (c) of the Act,58 to exclusively process them during
the first sixty days.
By making each the agent of the other for the purpose of receiving
charges, both the EEOC and the 706 Agency are able to expand
their availability throughout the states. In addition, proceedings are
initiated upon receipt by either the 706 Agency or by the Commission.
This procedure is authorized by the Commission's regulations,59 and
is consistent with the facts and the holding in Love.60
In Love, proceedings were initiated with the 706 Agency by the
simple expedient of notifying the 706 Agency by telephone of the
existence of a charge, which then allowed the 706 Agency to waive
its rights to the exclusive processing of the charge, thereby allowing
the charge to be timely filed with the EEOC. 6' The agreement between
the deferral agency and the EEOC memorializes a procedure in which
the 706 Agency proceedings can be initiated and the Agency can
waive its right to the initial sixty day exclusive processing period,
over certain classes of charges, simultaneously, by prior agreement.
It thereby enhances the effective enforcement of the Act and complies
with the intent of Congress in the face of an ever growing volume
of charges of employment discrimination.
Moreover, the agency provision ensures that an aggrieved individual
is advised of both his/her state and federal rights and, through a
dual filing provision, can file a charge with both agencies simulta-
neously. While a charge is sufficient for the EEOC when "the
Commission receives from the person making the charge a written
statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe
generally the action or the practices complained of," 6 2 so that a
charge taken by the 706 Agency would also constitute a charge for
the EEOC, the converse may not be true in some jurisdictions where
56. Id. section III, p. 413.
57. Id. section 11(a), p. 411.
58. Id. section 111(b), p. 413.
59. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.8 (1986). The 706 Agency, by operation of the work-
sharing agreement, is a "designated representative" of the Commission.
60. Love, supra note 16, at 525.
61. Id. at 524.
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1986).
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the 706 Agency may not be able to accept the charge if it is written
on the EEOC charge form. This does not present any section 706(c)
problems for the EEOC, however, because the filing of a timely
charge with a 706 Agency is not required by the Act.63 In order to
comply with section 706(c), the only statutory requirement is that
proceedings be initiated with the 706 Agency.
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, the worksharing agreements
spell out a full cooperative relationship between the 706 Agency and
the EEOC 64 to overcome those procedural obstacles which inhibit the
effective enforcement of the both the federal and state employment
discrimination laws.
The worksharing agreement divides the work of the agencies so as
to avoid duplication of effort and to compensate for variability in
staff availability and, while this division can be made along the lines
that each agency will investigate and resolve those charges that were
originated in their respective offices, it can and often is divided based
upon the availability of staff to perform the compliance functions. 65
In 1984, for example, the Commission reported that it had received
52,103 charges and the 706 Agencies had received 34,237 charges.
However, because of worksharing, the EEOC was able to transfer
4924 of the charges that it received to the 706 Agencies for their
processing.
66
III. THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY
The most controversial feature of the worksharing agreement is
the waiver, or the advanced waiver provision, in which the 706
Agency relinquishes its right to exclusively process some charges
arising in its jurisdiction during the first sixty days of the charges'
63. Love, supra note 16, at 525 n.4, which states:
Respondent cites the following language of § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b):
If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by
a state or local authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written
and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the
proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this
subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the
appropriate state or local authority.
Nothing in this language implies that a state proceeding may not be
commenced by an oral complaint; the statute guards against state proceedings
that are difficult to commence, not against ones that are easily begun.
See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1979).
64. See supra note 55.
65. Id.
66. EEOC 19TH ANNUAL REPORT 18 (1984).
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existence. 67 The current procedural rules authorizing the 706 Agency
to waive its exclusive right to initial processing68 are largely unchanged
from those final rules announced by the Commission on August 26,
1981,69 and which were published after a period of public comment
on the interim rules. 70 Among the comments received by the Com-
mission were several objections to the legality of 706 Agency waivers
of the right to exclusive processing or to EEOC's filing of a charge
after a waiver but before sixty days have passed in light of Mohasco.
7
1
In response, the Commission noted that Mohasco did not involve
such a waiver; 72 that waivers with the consent of the charging party
and the consequent attaching of federal jurisdiction have been ex-
plicitly and implicitly approved by many courts; 73 that every court
addressing the issue has held that a waiver by the 706 Agency
constitutes a termination of proceedings; 74 and that the Commission
was not aware of any conclusive case law to the contrary. 75
In Mohasco, the Supreme Court was concerned with an EEOC
regulation in which the definition of "filing" varied within different
sections of the Act. Prior to Mohasco, the Commission's regulation
76
provided an interpretation that section 706(e) established filing for
purposes of timeliness so that if a charge was received by the EEOC
within 300 days, in a deferral state, it was considered timely. The
Commission's regulation however, interpreted section 706(c) to es-
tablish filing for purposes of processing, which meant that so long
as the charge was received by the EEOC within 300 days it was
timely. The only purpose of section 706(c) of the Act, in the view
of the EEOC, was to prevent the EEOC from interfering with the
706 Agency during the first sixty days, even if, in so doing, the
EEOC could not act until some period after the 300 day period.
The Mohasco Court noted, however, that charges filed after 240
days and before 301 days could be timely filed if, and only if, the
706 Agency terminates its proceedings earlier than the 301st day from
67. See supra note 40.
68. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(3)(iii) (1986) as amended by 52 Fed. Reg. 10224
(1987) and 52 Fed. Reg. 18353 (1987).
69. 46 Fed. Reg. 43037 (1981).
70. Id.





76. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b)(1)(v)(A) (1977).
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the date of the alleged violation. 7  It is clear that no attention was
focused by the Court on either the statutory meaning or the statutory
intent of the term "unless proceedings are earlier terminated" except
to acknowledge that a charge filed after the 240th day could be
timely filed if the 706 Agency terminated its proceedings before the
expiration of the 300 days.
78
This can be and routinely is accomplished by the division of work
and waiver provisions of the worksharing agreement. The implication
of the Courts ruling, in Love, that permitted proceedings to be
initiated with the 706 Agency by telephone, 79 is that proceedings
could also be terminated by telephone. Thus, when charges are
received on the 300th day by the EEOC, it could initiate proceedings
by telephone and the 706 Agency could terminate proceedings in the
same call with the result that the charge would be filed timely with
the EEOC even on the 300th day. This somewhat cumbersome
procedure is obviated by the express agreement of the EEOC and
the 706 Agency in the worksharing agreement.
Since the EEOC's comments on August 26, 1981 on the validity
of its regulation authorizing 706 Agencies to waive their exclusive
right to initial processing a split has developed in the United States
Circuit Courts of Appeal over the meaning of the term "termination
of proceedings" and whether a 706 Agency terminates its proceedings
within the meaning of section 706(c) of the Act when it enters into
worksharing agreements with the EEOC and voluntarily relinquishes
its right to the initial processing of charges of employment discrim-
ination.80
In Gilardi v. Schroeder,8" the aggrieved first presented her charge
to the EEOC in January 1982 when she completed an intake ques-
tionnaire.8 2 She converted the intake questionnaire to a formal charge
on March 1, 1982,83 in which she complained of sexual harassment
84
that occurred on September 12, 1981.8S The EEOC stamped the copy
received on March 31, 1982.86 The 706 Agency received the charge
77. Mohasco, supra note 7, at 814 n.16.
78. Id.
79. Love, supra note 16, at 525.
80. See supra note 40.
81. 833 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1987).
82. Id. at 1229.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1228.
86. Id. at 1229.
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and, pursuant to the terms of its worksharing agreement with the
EEOC, it waived its right to initial processing on April 1, 1982.87
The court avoided deciding whether the intake questionnaire con-
stituted a charge for purposes of timeliness,88 and instead held that
the charge was timely because it was filed with the EEOC within the
300 days permitted by section 706(e)89 and the Commission's regu-
lations. 90 The aggrieved, therefore, filed her charge on the 200th day
after the sexual harassment and approximately 195 days9' after her
discharge. The 706 Agency initiated and terminated its proceedings
a day later, on April 1, 1982. It would appear that but for the
operation of the waiver provision of the worksharing agreement, this
is a Mohasco type charge, since the unlawful acts occurred in a
deferral state and under the provisions of section 706(e) the aggrieved
had at least 240 days to file with the EEOC unless proceedings were
initiated 92 and terminated before the 300th day. Using March 31,
1982, as the date on which the plaintiff, Gilardi, brought her com-
plaint to the EEOC, (day 200), and ignoring the operation of the
worksharing agreement which terminated proceedings on the 201st
day, her charge would have been filed with the EEOC sixty days
later, on the 260th day, May 30, 1982, or sooner under the Mohasco
formula because the state was without jurisdiction, since the state
statute of limitations for filing a charge with the 706 Agency was
180 days. 93 The court, relying upon Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,94 gave substantial weight to the
EEOC's interpretation of the Act embodied in its regulations95 and
held that the charge was timely filed with the EEOC. 96
87. Id. at 1232.
88. Id. at 1230.
89. Id. at 1230-31.
90. Id. at 1232.
91. Id. at 1234 (Manion, J., dissenting).
92. There is no requirement in § 706(c) of the Act that the charge be timely
under the state statute, nor is there a requirement that a charge be filed with the
706 Agency. The only requirement is that proceedings be initiated with the 706
Agency. See Oscar Mayer, supra note 63.
93. Gilardi, supra note 40, at 1234.
94. Id. at 1232, citing Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1985).
95. Id. The Court upheld 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(3)(1986) which stated that:
[c]harges arising in jurisdictions having a 706 Agency but which charges are
apparently untimely under the applicable state or local statute of limitations
are filed with the Commission upon receipt. Such charges are timely filed if
received by the Commission within 300 days from the date of the alleged
violation. Copies of all such charges will be forwarded to the appropriate 706
Agency.
96. Gilardi, supra note 40, at 1233.
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In Isaac v. Harvard University,97 the aggrieved was told that he
was not recommended for tenure on June 27, 1975.98 He filed his
charge with EEOC on February 23, 1976, 241 days later, 99 and on
March 4, 1976, the EEOC sent a copy of his charge to the 706
Agency. 1°° On March 16, 1976, 263 days since the alleged discrimi-
natory act,' 0' the EEOC was notified that the 706 Agency would not
process the charge, 10 2 however, as Harvard argued, the 706 Agency
had not terminated its proceedings because on March 7, 1979, it
issued its finding of probable cause.103
Thus the issue before the court was whether a 706 Agency termi-
nates its proceedings, within the meaning of section 706(c) of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, where it discontinues its
processing of a charge and resumes processing at a later time.
Harvard equated the language of section 706(c) to mean total relin-
quishment of the case. 1°4 The court found the terms "terminated"
and "proceedings" to be ambiguous'015 and, after reviewing the
legislative history of section 706(c) of the Act, concluded that "[tihe
legislative history is full of references to the 'limited' nature of the
federal deferral." 106
The court dismissed Harvard's argument that Congress intended
federal jurisdiction only when the 706 Agency has finally ceased its
action and not where it merely suspends action. The court stated
that "section 706(c) is not an exhaustion statute"'0 7 since "it specif-
ically envisions concurrent EEOC processing if state proceedings
continue beyond sixty days."' 18 Additionally, the court noted that
"section 706(c) was first and foremost, a statute of deference. Thus,
once a state agency declines the full sixty days of deferral, the
legislative history suggests that section 706(c) no longer has a pur-
pose." 09
97. 769 F.2d 817 (1st Cir. 1985).






104. Id. at 820.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 823. The court noted that Congress wanted only to keep the federal
agency from usurping the state's role in the employment discrimination field. "Once
a state seeks federal involvement, however, there is no need for deferral." Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 824.
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In examining the facts of the case, the court concluded that "[i]n
light of the legislative history's emphasis on the temporary nature of
the federal deferral, it seems only sensible to find that when a state
agency acts in this manner-suspending the processing of a claim
and looking to the EEOC for further action-the state agency has
"terminated" its "proceedings" within the meaning of section
706(c)." 10
The court expressly rejected Harvard's contention that equating
suspension with termination would conflict with the Mohasco policy
for interpreting filing requirements,"'I stating that its "interpretation
serves the primary purpose of the statute-to give states a chance to
go first in processing employment discrimination claims-while fur-
thering the broad policy of Title VII to provide relief from such
discrimination as quickly as possible."" 2 (emphasis in original).
Harvard's penultimate argument was that the language of the
EEOC's regulations" 3 supported its contention that "terminate" does
not mean a temporary cessation of processing." 4 The court concluded
however, that "when there is reasonable doubt as to the statute's
meaning, 'the EEOC's interpretation of 706(c)...' is entitled to great
deference."" 5 (citations omitted).
Harvard's final argument was that the 706 Agency was without
authority to waive its rights under the Massachusetts statute."16 The
court disputed this reading of the statute and concluded that whatever
the meaning, it would not affect the court's view that under the
federal statute, section 706(c), the 706 Agency had "terminated" its
"proceedings" when it did what it did in the case. In any event,
whether the deferral agency had authority to waive its rights under
the federal statute or not, it would not affect the rights of Isaac
with the EEOC." 7
In Dixon v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.," 8 the aggrieved was
discharged on December 18, 1981. 9 On August 4, 1982, she filed a
110. Id. at 825.
111. Id. at 826.
112. Id.
113. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(5)(ii)(B) (1984).
114. Id.
115. Isaac, supra note 97, at 827.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 787 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, (July 9, 1986)(No.
86-181).
119. Id. at 944.
19871
DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW
charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC, 20 and on August 11,
1982, the 706 Agency advised the aggrieved by mail that it was
terminating its proceedings.'
2'
Under Mohasco, because the aggrieved, Dixon, lived in a deferral
state she had 300 days to file her charge with the EEOC, however,
the charge is not timely filed until the 706 Agency has initiated
proceedings and either sixty days pass before the 300th day or the
706 Agency earlier terminates its proceedings. In Dixon, the aggrieved
delivered her charge to the EEOC 229 days after the alleged discrim-
inatory incident, and filed her charge on the 236th day because the
706 Agency earlier terminated its proceedings, however, in this in-
stance the 706 Agency earlier terminated its proceedings pursuant to
the provisions of a worksharing agreement, which provided a waiver
for those charges received by the EEOC in which the alleged discrim-
inatory act occurred within the more than 180 days but less than 300
days period.
22
The court held that the aggrieved had failed to file a timely charge
with the EEOC because the extended period of 300 days for filing a
charge as provided in section 706(e) was only available to those who
initiated proceedings with the deferral agency and, relying on the
express provisions of the worksharing agreement, as they pertained
to the division of work and the waiver of the 706 Agency's exclusive
right to initially process a class of charges, the court concluded that
the aggrieved lacked the necessary intent to initiate proceedings with
the deferral agency and merely intended to inform the deferral agency
of the matter. 23 Consequently, the court believed that she had to
file her charge, if at all, within 180 days after the discriminatory act.
This opinion turns, not on the meaning of "termination of pro-
ceedings," but on the fact that the worksharing agreements define
the division of the workload between the agencies so exactly, and
they identify the circumstances in which the 706 Agency will refrain
from exercising its exclusive initial processing authority, that one can
read into the agreement an absence of intent to initiate proceedings
with the 706 Agency.
Since Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 24 however, proceedings may
be initiated with 706 Agencies despite the fact that the statute of
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at n.1.
123. Id. at 945-46.
124. See Oscar Mayer, supra note 63.
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limitations for the filing of a charge with the 706 Agency has expired.
It would seem that in the Oscar Mayer circumstance, where the
parties know that it is impossible to initiate proceedings, that they
too would lack the requisite intent that the court required in Dixon.
However, unlike Dixon, Oscar Mayer type plaintiffs would receive
the benefit of the full 300 days in which to file their charge.
In E.E.O.C. v. Commercial Office Products,'25 the issue, like that
in Isaac, centers on the meaning of "termination of proceedings."'
26
The aggrieved was discharged on June 10, 1983, and filed a charge
with the EEOC on March 26, 1984.127 On March 30, 1984, the EEOC
notified the 706 Agency that the Commission would process the
charge pursuant to the terms of the worksharing agreement.' 28 The
706 Agency waived its right to initially process the charge 29 and
notified the aggrieved that it retained jurisdiction over her charge
even though it relinquished its right to initially process the charge.'30
Using the Mohasco rule, the aggrieved has 300 days in which to
file a charge with the EEOC in a deferral state. She may file the
charge after 240 days so long as proceedings are initiated and
terminated with the deferral agency before the 300th day, There is
no requirement that the aggrieved file a timely charge with the 706
Agency, only that proceeding be initiated.' In Commercial Office
Products, the aggrieved brought her complaint to the EEOC on the
290th day, in a deferral state where the state statute of limitations
for filing a state charge was 180 days. Thus, in order for the
complaint to become a charge, the 706 Agency would have to initiate
and terminate proceedings before April 5, 1984. The 706 Agency
waived its right to initially process the charge on March 30, 1984.
Therefore, the charge should be timely filed with the EEOC. How-
ever, Commercial claimed that the charge was untimely and refused
to cooperate with the administrative process and a subpoena was
issued. 32 The trial court denied enforcement of the subpoena because
it decided that the charge was not timely filed with the EEOC.' 33
125. 803 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 3208 (1987).
126. 803 F.2d at 587.




131. Oscar Mayer, supra note 63.
132. Commercial Office Products, supra note 9, at 584.
133. Id.
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The appellate court, in its analysis, examined the text of the statute,
the legislative history, and the relevant judicial interpretation.'
34 It
decided that the aggrieved's charge was "initially instituted"'3 with
the 706 Agency and, therefore, the aggrieved was entitled to the 300
day limitation for filing a charge with the EEOC as provided by
section 706(e) of the Act.'
36
The court next decided that the charge was not filed with the
EEOC on the date that it was received because of the statutory
requirements of section 706(c) of the Act,'37 the EEOC's regulations
to the contrary, notwithstanding.' 38 It then examined what a 706
Agency must do to "terminate its proceedings under section 706(c)"
of the Act,'39 and concluded that the interpretation of the Isaac
Court, namely "that a state agency 'terminates' its proceedings within
the meaning of section 706(c) when the state agency waives its right
to initially process a charge, defers to the EEOC, and retains juris-
diction to act after the EEOC has completed its proceedings,"' 4° was
"contrary to its plain meaning, inconsistent with settled judicial
interpretations of Title VII, and a subversion of the goals Congress
sought to achieve by including a deferral requirement."41
The Commercial Office Products court held that the plain and
ordinary meaning of "terminate" involves the end or completion of
an activity,' 42 and that neither "terminate" nor "proceedings" is
ambiguous in the context of section 706(c). 143 Next, it decided that
a complete termination of 706 Agency's proceedings was necessary
to accomplish Congress' two goals in enacting the legislation: (1) to
encourage state and local agencies to resolve civil rights disputes,
and (2) to prevent premature intervention in what the Congress
believed to be a state responsibility.'" Under this analysis the court
reasoned that the filing of a federal charge was much like a last
resort if the state failed to resolve the dispute. '45
134. Id. at 585.
135. Id. at 586.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 586.
138. Id.
139. Id.




144. Id. at 588.
145. Id. at 589.
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In examining the action of the State in terminating its proceedings,
the court reviewed the operation of the worksharing agreement
between the agencies and concluded that the worksharing agreement
created a "reverse deferral" in which the 706 Agency deferred to
the EEOC,' 4 and, therefore, the sixty day deferral period contained
in section 706(c) of the Act could be avoided by the expedient of
not filing initially with the 706 Agency.' 47 After concluding that the
worksharing agreement is not a substitute for deferral, 148 the court
did not decide whether or not a 706 Agency could waive its exclusive
right to initial processing,149 but instead held that because the 706
Agency did not "finally and unequivocally terminate its authority
over Leerssen's [the aggrieved's] charge"' 150 it "had not terminated
its proceedings and the charge cannot be deemed to have been filed
with the EEOC because the sixty day deferral period had not ex-
pired."',5
In Commercial Office Products, the aggrieved, who had lost her
rights to file a charge under the state statute because the limitations
period had expired, was prevented from filing a federal charge
because the 706 Agency was unable to terminate its proceedings over
a charge that the Agency could not have taken under its own statute,
but was willing to review for compliance with the state statute after
the EEOC completed its investigation. This result is absurd and,
without doubt, not one that was intended by Congress. The national
policy, that employees should have a federal right to be free from
discrimination in the workplace, should not be made to hinge upon
plain meaning definitions of statutory language that negate the broad
remedial policy of the statute.
It is a well established canon of statutory construction that when
the "plain and unambiguous" meaning of the statutory language
produces "absurd or mischievous consequences or would thwart
manifest purpose" it must not be given effect. 52 Equally well estab-
lished is the canon that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed
and if a retroactive interpretation will promote the ends of justice,




149. Id. at n.13.
150. Id. at 590.
151. Id.
152. Llewellyn, supra note 49, at 403 n.25.
153. Id. at 402 n.16.
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Given the absurd results in both Commercial Office Products and
Dixon, which have been created by the mischief of section 706(c) of
the Act and by the plain meaning advocates, it would appear that it
is time either for the Congress to modify the Act or for the courts
to adopt the EEOC's worksharing agreement as a creative solution,
which is entitled to "great deference." '11 4 This would help to alleviate
the problem of the statutory mischief of concurrent jurisdiction
contained in Section 706(c) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, and guarantee one's federal right to be free from
unlawful employment discrimination.
APPENDIX
WORKSHARING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RE-
LATIONS COMMISSION AND THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COM-
MISSION
I. GENERAL
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (hereinafter the
"PHRC") has jurisdiction over allegations of employment discrimi-
nation occurring within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania based
on race, color, religious creed, sex, age, national origin, ancestry,
non-job related handicap or disability, or abortion or sterilization
pursuant to section 5, subsection (a) through (g) and section 5.2 of
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (hereinafter the "Human
Relations Act"). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(hereinafter the "EEOC") has jurisdiction over allegations of em-
ployment discrimination occurring with the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (Supp. 11 1972) (hereinafter "Title VII") and on allegations
based on age and equal pay violations pursuant to the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (here-
inafter the "Age Act") and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (hereinafter the "Equal Pay Act"), respectively.
In recognition of the common jurisdiction and goals of the two
agencies, the PHRC and the EEOC have agreed to this worksharing
154. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971).
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agreement which is designed to provide individuals with an efficient
procedure for obtaining redress for their grievances under the relevant
state and federal laws.
II. FILING ALLEGATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION (CHARGES)
a) In order to facilitate the assertion of employment rights, the
EEOC and the PHRC each designate the other as its agent for the
purpose of receiving charges.
b) Each agency will inform individuals of their right to file with
the other agency and will endeavor to aid any person who is alleging
employment discrimination to draft a charge in a manner that will
satisfy the requirements of the other agency or to otherwise assist
that person in the filing of the charge with the other agency.
c) A charge filed on the PHRC Complaint Form which meets
EEOC's jurisdictional and procedural requirements and which is
referred to EEOC by PHRC for dual-filing will be considered as a
charge filed with EEOC. Section 6 of the PHRC Complaint Form
will state "This charge will be referred to EEOC for the purpose of
dual-filing." This adaptation of the PHRC Complaint Form will
meet the requirements of the EEOC/PHRC Contracts.
d) The delegation of authority to receive charges contained in
paragraph 11(a) does not include the right of one agency to determine
the jurisdiction of the other agency over a charge.
e) Each agency will endeavor to forward all appropriate charges
to the other agency on a daily basis or as soon as practicable.
f) Within one week of EEOC's receipt of a dual-filed charge, or
as soon as otherwise practicable, EEOC will provide PHRC with
either EEOC's charge number or the reason the referred charge was
unacceptable for docketing by EEOC.
g) Within one week of PHRC's receipt of a deferred charge for
which a waiver by PHRC has not been sought, or as soon as is
practicable, PHRC Headquarters will inform EEOC whether the
charge has been accepted by PHRC for initial processing. For those
charges which have been accepted for initial processing, PHRC will
notify EEOC within sixty days of PHRC's initial receipt as to
PHRC's docket number or reason for non-docketing. If there has
been no PHRC response, EEOC will contact PHRC to determine
the PHRC status and EEOC may assert its jurisdiction over the
charge. If this is the case, EEOC will confirm in writing.
h) Where EEOC defers a charge for which PHRC is to be the
initial processor, EEOC will notify the charging party of the deferral
and of the address and telephone number of the appropriate PHRC
19871
DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW
Regional Office. If a PHRC Complaint Form has not been completed
by EEOC, EEOC will encourage the charging party to contact the
appropriate PHRC Regional Office immediately to file the complaint
with PHRC.
i) Where either agency receives a charge which will be initially
processed by the other agency, the agency receiving the charge will
forward all information obtained at the time of intake to the other
agency.
j) Age charges initially received by EEOC will be "referred" to
PHRC to preserve the charging party's federal court rights. Where
necessary to meet provisions of age contract with PHRC, EEOC will
designate certain co-jurisdictional charges as "transmitted" to be
initially processed by PHRC. For "walk-in" age charges initially
received by EEOC which appear suitable to be transmittals, EEOC
will endeavor to take the charge on a PHRC Complaint Form as
well as on an EEOC Charge Form. This PHRC Complaint Form
will be completed in a manner so as to facilitate the docketing of
the complaint by PHRC to include the following: charging party and
respondent name; to indicate that the charge has also been filied
with the EEOC; the form will be signed by the charging party and
will, whenever possible, be notarized. For the addresses of the
charging party and the respondent and also for the details of the
allegation it will be sufficient to refer to the attached EEOC Charge
Form. Both the PHRC and EEOC Charge Forms will be sent to
PHRC.
k) Age referrals/transmittals will be sent to PHRC on a weekly
basis.
III. DISION OF INITIAL CHARGE PROCESSING RESPONSIBILITIES
a) Because of the large number of charges that are anticipated and
pending and the inability of both agencies to process these charges
separately in a timely manner with existing resources, both PHRC
and EEOC have concluded that the intent of the laws that they
administer can best be served by dividing primary responsibility for
resolution of charges between the agencies.
b) Consistent with section V(g) of this Agreement, in order to
facilitate early resolution of charges which will be initially processed
by EEOC, the PHRC waives the rights granted to it under section
706(c) and (d) of Title VII to have an exclusive opportunity for sixty
days to resolve the Title VII charges assigned to EEOC. Consistent
with section II(e) of the Agreement, EEOC will forward to PHRC
a copy of all charges for which waiver has been requested. If PHRC
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determines that the identical charge has already been filed with PHRC
or otherwise determines that the charge is one which more appro-
priately chould be initially processed by PHRC, PHRC will contact
EEOC to consult as to which agency will continue to process the
charge. The charges assigned to the EEOC for initial processing are
specified in Paragraph Ill(d) below.
c) The PHRC will initially process the following categories of
charges:
1) Except as specified in this Paragraph III: All charges initially
received by the PHRC;
2) All charges which allege more than one basis of discrimination
where at least one basis is not covered [by] the laws administered
by the EEOC but is covered by the Human Relations Act or
where EEOC is mandated by federal court decisions to dismiss
the charge but EEOC can process the charge;
3) All charges against Respondents who are designated for initial
processing by the PHRC in a supplementary memorandum to this
Agreement;
4) All charges filed by the PHRC;
5) Any charge where the PHRC is a party to a .Conciliation
Agreement or a Consent Decree which, upon mutual consultation
and agreement, is determined to be relevant to the disposition of
the charge. PHRC will notify EEOC of all Conciliation Agree-
ments and Consent Decrees which have features relevant to the
disposition of subsequent charges;
6) Any charges alleging retaliation for filing a charge with PHRC
or for cooperating with the PHRC;
7) Age charges initially received by EEOC which are designeated
by EEOC as transmittals to be initially processed by PHRC.
d) The EEOC will initially process the following categories of
charges:
1) Except as specified in this Paragraph 111(c); All charges initially
received by the EEOC; This will included charges filed under Title
VII, the Age Act and the Equal Pay Act;
2) All charges against Respondents who are designated for initial
processing by the EEOC in a supplementary memorandum to this
Agreement. This will include charges designated by EEOC as
Early Litigation Vehicles ("ELI");
3) All charges filed by EEOC Commissioners;
4) Any charge where the EEOC is a party to a Conciliation
Agreement or a Consent Decree which, upon mutual consultation
and agreement, is determined to be relevant to the disposition of.
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the charge. The EEOC will notify the PHRC of all Conciliation
Agreements and Consent Decrees which have features relevant to
the disposition of subsequent charges;
5) Any charge alleging retaliation for filing a charge with EEOC
or for cooperating with EEOC;
6) Any charge filed against the PHRC by a PHRC employee.
e) For Title VII charges initially received by EEOC for which
advance waiver by PHRC is requested under this Agreement, for
Title VII charges initially received by EEOC which are beyond
PHRC's jurisdiction, for age charges initially received by EEOC
which are not designated by EEOC as transmittals, EEOC will
consider the charge to be filed with EEOC upon-receipt and will
initiate its processing of the charge.
f) Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 111(c) and (d), the
PHRC or the EEOC may request and may be granted the right to
process any charge either initially or at any subsequent stage. Such
requests shall be in writing and addressed to the PHRC Director of
Compliance or the EEOC District Director (for charges arising from
within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Philadelphia Office of
EEOC) or the Area Director (for charges arising from within the
jurisdictional boundaries of the Pittsburgh Office of the EEOC) and
shall specify the charges(s) and reason(s) for such request. The
response shall be in writing within ten working days of receipt of
the request and, if the request is denied, reason for such rejection
shall be supplied. In the event of no response within the specified
period, a telephone follow-up will be made to the person to whom
the request was sent. A verbal response relative to the granting or
denying of the request will be secured and will be immediately
confirmed in writing by the agency receiving the request. If the
request is not granted, the requesting agency will, except under special
circumstances, refrain from processing the charge. If, however, the
requesting agency still intends to process the charge, it will notify
the other agency of this decision in writing of this decision. For
charges for which EEOC has specifically asked PHRC to waive its
processing or to place its investigation in abeyance, accepted closure
credit will be given to PHRC if PHRC's investigative efforts to that
point significantly contribute to EEOC's subsequent closure action.
g) If for any reason an agency chooses not to process a charge
for which it bears initial responsibility pursuant to this Agreement,
that agency will inform the other agency of its decision not to process
the charge within ten days of that decision.
[Vol. 26:379
WORKSHARING A GREEMENTS
IV. RESOLUTION OF CHARGES
a) In order to expedite the resolution of a charge initially processed
by one agency, that agency will permit the other agency to copy or
to obtain copies of any information developed during the investiga-
tion and to utilize that information in its proceedings. The agency
accepting the information agrees to comply with any confidentiality
requirements imposed on the agency forwarding the information,
provided, however, that the sharing of any such information, includ-
ing efforts at conciliation, shall not be deemed to be making such
information public.
b) In order to expedite the resolution of charges or to facilitate
the working of this Agreement, either agency's Office Director may
request or permit personnel of the other agency to accompany or
observe its personnel when processing a charge. The agency having
initial responsibility for processing the charge will also have the
primary responsibility for carrying the case forward.
c) PHRC will provide EEOC with notice of all final actions taken
with respect to charges which have been filed with both agencies.
Such notice will be in a form mutually agreed by the agencies
consistent with the requirements of EEOC Headquarters. EEOC will
provide PHRC with notice of all final actions taken with respect to
charges filed with both agencies which are still open with PHRC. In
addition, EEOC will provide notification to PHRC of final actions
regarding any other charges upon request.
d) Consistent with sections 1601.21(e) of EEOC's Procedural Re-
gulations and 5.5 of EEOC's Compliance Manual, EEOC will not
commence its review for substantial weight until after PHRC has
issued its closure letters to all parties and the PHRC appeal period
has expired. EEOC will each month provide copies of all review
forms for charges reviewed by EEOC. In addition, EEOC will provide
PHRC with monthly statistical reports showing acceptance/rejection
rates with analysis where appropriate.
e) In determining whether or not reasonable cause exists to believe
that an employment practice is unlawful, the EEOC will, pursuant
to section 706(b) of Title VII, accord substantial weight to final
findings and orders of the PHRC. The EEOC will also grant "ac-
cepted closure" credit to all other resolutions which meet require-
ments of EEOC.
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF WORKSHARING
a) Each agency will designate liaison officials for the other agency
to contact concerning the day to day implementation of this Agree-
ment.
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b) The agencies will monitor the allocation of charge processing
responsibilities under Paragraphs 111(c) and (d) to insure that they
serve the purposes of Paragraph 111(a). Where it appears that the
overall projected division of charge processing responsibilities will
.not be met by the assignments in Paragraph III(c) and (d) or where
the overall projection appears inappropriate, Paragraph 111(c) and
(d) may, with the consent of both agencies, be modified to ensure
full utilization of the processing capacitites of both agencies and
rapid redress for allegations of unlawful employment discrimination.
c) Both parties agree to provide each other with all resource and
research data available that will assist in the processing of charges
and the elimination of employment discrimination.
d) Both parties will disseminate this Agreement to all appropriate
staff members and provide training to appropriate personnel who
will have the responsibility of implementing this Agreement.
e) Both parties agree to allow employees of the other agency to
participate in formal and informal (OJT) training arranged for mem-
bers of its own staff.
f) It is understood that nothing contained herein shall be construed
in such a way as to negate or violate the policies and regulations of
either agency. It is also understood that this Agreement is subject to
such amendment or modification as may be required from time to
time to meet changes in regulations.
g) This Agreement shall operate from the date of signature by the
Directors of both agencies to the 30th day of September, 1983 and
may be renewed by mutual consent of the parties after projecting
the anticipated charge processing capacity of both agencies. Sections
contained herein may be revised or rescinded at any time during this
period upon mutual consent of both agencies. Representatives of the
two agencies will meet at least on a quarterly basis to discuss the
provisions of the Agreement. This Agreement supercedes any previ-
ously negotiated Memorandum of Understanding or Worksharing
Agreement.
AMENDMENT TO WORKSHARING AGREEMENT
Effective November 1, 1982, the following procedures will apply for
Title VII charges initially received by EEOC which are co-jurisdic-
tional with PHRC:
1. a) The EEOC Intake Unit will provide "walk-in" charging parties
a PHRC form letter which will be supplied by PHRC. This letter
will inform charging parties of their right to also file the charge with
PHRC and will provide instructions for so doing. The charging party
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will be asked to sign an acknowledgment that he/she has received
the JHRC letter from EEOC. In implementing the Lucus decision,
complaints deferred to local 706 Agencies will not be deferred to
PHRC.
b) The original of the PHRC letter will be given to the charging
party. A copy will be sent to PHRC with the deferral correspondence.
c) For "mail-in" charges, EEOC will merely send PHRC a copy
of the charge correspondence and the EEOC Form 212 forwarding
the charge. For such charges, EEOC will not notify the charging
party of any right to file with PHRC as this will be done directly
by PHRC.
d) PHRC will notify the EEOC offices on a quarterly basis of
all charges which were initially filed with EEOC and which were
subsequently filed with PHRC to preserve their state rights.
e) EEOC will send to PHRC within thirty days of its receipt of
this listing appropriate closure correspondence/documentation for
charges closed by EEOC.
f) EEOC will attempt to make closures such as settlement actions,
withdrawals, unable to locate or failure to cooperate applicable to
PHRC as well as to EEOC. PHRC will provide to EEOC instructions
for such closures and any applicable documents that would facilitate
such closures.
g) Upon request, EEOC will provide the entire EEOC file to
PHRC for review and/or copying.
h) Where a case has been closed by EEOC as adjusted and the
charging party notifies PHRC that the terms of the agreement had
not been met, PHRC will refer the charging party to EEOC for
enforcement of the EEOC agreement.
i) EEOC will notifiy PHRC in writing when it plans to destroy
case files (according to the EEOC disposition schedules) when the
charge(s) has also been filed with PHRC. PHRC will have thirty
days from the date of notification by EEOC to inform EEOC if it
still has any interest in any given file about to be destroyed by EEOC
and at the same time will make arrangements to obtain the file or a
copy thereof.
2. In order to identify the current status of dual-filed charges, EEOC
will make available to PHRC its quarterly printout of open EEOC
charges.
ADDENDUM TO WORKSHARING AGREEMENT
This addendum modifies the attached Worksharing Agreement
as follows:
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The EEOC will process all charges referred from other federal
agencies against respondents who are recipients of federal financial
assistance subject to: (1) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
(2) Titile IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972; (3) State and
Local Fiscal Assitance Act of 1972, as amended; and, (4) provisions
similar to Title VI and Title IX in federal grant statutes to the extent
such provisions relate to the prohibition of employment discrimina-
tion covered by Title VII and the Equal Pay Act of 1963.
Charges in process under fact-finding, investigation, and settlement
procedures on or before March 28, 1983, shall not be affected by
this amendment and will be processed to completion according to
previously prescribed procedures.
